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153 C.W 437; 341 P.2d 2lI9J 
[L. A. No. 25379. In Bank. July 2, 1959.] 
SOPHIE SHAPIRO et al., Respondents, v. REPUBIJIC 
INDEMNITY COMPANY OF AMERICA (a Corpora-
tion), Appellant. 
[1] Automobiles - Indemnity Insurance - Persons Insured.-In-
sured's son, a minor, who was driving the insured autolilobile 
at the time of an accident causing injuries to others, and who ' 
was then a member of the arllled forces, was not a resident of 
the insured's household within the meaning of an automobile 
public liability policy excluding coverage of dI'ivers under 25 
who were rellidents of the insured's household. 
[2] Insurance--Remedies of Injured Person Against Insurer-De-
fenses.-In a suit by injured third persons against the tort 
feasor's insurer, the insurer lllay raise any defense against 
the injured persons that it could have raised against the 
insured, such as that it was entitled to reformation of the 
policy, but a reformation judgment, if obtained against the 
insured, was not res judicllta against plaintiffs who were not 
parties to the prior action. 
[3] Id.-Remedies of Injured Person Against Insurer-Defenses.-
Where a judgment of reformation of an insurance policy ob-
tained by the insurer against the insured was entered after' 
plaintiffs had suffered the injuries for which they l'ecovered 
judgment against the insured, plaintiffs as third-party bene-
ficiaries of the policy then had an interest that could not be 
altered or conditioned by independent action of the insurer 
and the insured. Nor could those rights be conclusively deter-
mined against the injured parties in an action to which they 
were not made parties. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Burnett Wolfson, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action on an automobile public liability insurance policy. 
Judgment for plaintiffs affirmed. 
Wyman & Finell and Marvin Finell for Appellant. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Insurance, § 508; Am.Jur., Automobile In-
surance, ~ 108. 
[2] St·p Cal.Jur.2d, Illsurullep, § 49H t'1 seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Automobiles, § 68-1; [2, 3J Iusur-
:lIIel', § 33·11:2). 
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Oscar Richard Cummins and Morton R. Goodman for Re-
spondents. 
TRAYNOR, J. - Plaintiffs recovered judgments against 
John and Pauline Campbell and their son in a personal ill-
jury action that arose out of a collision with the Campbells' 
automobile. Plaintiffs then brought an action on the public 
liability insurance policy that was issued by defendant cover-
ing the Campbells' automobile. (See Ins. Code, § 11580, subd. 
(b)(2).) Defendant appeals from a judgment for $13,346.89 
in that action in favor of plaintiffs. 
As originally written, the policy defined the word ., in-
sured" to include one driving with the consent of the named 
insured, and included an endorsement that ., there is no oper-
ator of the automobile under twenty-five (25) years of age 
resident in the Named Insured's household or employed as a 
chauffeur of the automobile." [1] The Campbells' son, a 
minor, was driving the insured automobile at the time of the 
accident, with his parents' consent. Since he was a member 
of the armed forces at the time, however, he was not a resident 
of the insured '8 household within the meaning of the endorse-
ment, (Island v. Fi,.eman's Fund Indemnity 00., 30 Cal.2d 
541,547-548 (184 P.2d 153, 173 A.L.R. 896].) Accordingly, 
if plaintiffs' rights against the insurer are to be d('termined 
according to the terms of the original policy, the endorsement 
is no defense and the judgment of the trial ('ourt must ba 
aftlrmed. 
Defendant contends, however, that its liability to plaintiffs, 
if any, must be determined according to the policy as it was 
later reformed. The record discloses that following the acci-
dent, the CampbelIs brought an action against defeudant for a 
declaration of rights under the policy. In that action defend-
ant interposed a cross-complaint for reformation of the policy. 
The injured persons, plaintiffs in the present case, were not 
made parties to that suit. The trial court gt;anted reforma-
tion, substituting for the quoted endorsement a provision that: i 
.. [N] 0 insurance is afforded by any provision of this policy 
or of any endorsement attached hereto or issued to form a part 
hereof while any insured vehicle is being operated, maintained 
or used by or under the control of a person under hvcnty-five 
(25) years of age." The judgment of reformation was af-
firmed on appeal. (Omnpbell v. Republic Indemnity 00., 149 
Ca1.App.2d 476 [308 P.2d 425].) 
[2] Defendant contends that plaintiffs' rights under the 
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policy must be measured by its terms as reformed and that 
since the driver of the car was under 25 years of age there 
can be no recovery. This result, it is urged, is dictated by the 
rule that an injured person stands in the shoes of the insured, 
and has no greater rights against the insurer than the insured 
would have had he paid the judgment against him and then 
Rued the insurer. In support of this contention defendant 
invokes Valladno v. Fil'eman's Fund Indent. Co., 13 Ca1.2d 
322 [89 P.2d 643] ; Ford v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 
151 Cal.App.2d 431 [311 P.2d 930] ; and Olds v. General Acc. 
Fire etc. Corp., 67 Cal.App.2d 812 [155 P.2d 676]. These 
cases, however, stand only for the proposition that in a suit by 
an injured third person against the tort feasor's insurer, the 
insurer may raise any defense against the injured person 
that it could have raised against the insured. Thus, in Valla-
dao, the court held that judgment was properly entered for 
the defendant insurer notwithstanding the verdict, since the 
insurer had proved as a matter of law that the insured had 
violated a cooperation clause in the policy. As applied to the 
present case, these cases would support a ruling that defendant 
was entitled to make out a defense by pleading and proving 
facts showing that it was entitled to reformation of the policy. 
They are not authority, however, for the proposition that the 
reformation judgment is res judicata against plaintiffs, who 
were not parties to that action. Defendant relies solely on 
that judgment to support its claim of nonliability under the 
policy. 
The same contention was considered by the Supreme Court 
of New Jersey in Dransfield v. Oitizens Casualty Co., 5 N.J. 
190 [74 A.2d 304]. There the insurer pleaded as res judicata 
a decree it obtained against the insured by which the policy 
was declared void for fraud in its procurement. The decree 
was entered in a proceeding against the named insured alone, 
begun after the injuries were sustained. The court expressly 
recognized the rule that ., the injured party stands in the I 
shoes of the assured," but held that he ha~ a cause of action ' 
against the insurer at the time he is injured that ripens into 
a right of action when he recovers a judgment against the 
insured. It was held that his rights were not barred by the 
decree voiding the policy, since he was not a party to the 
earlier suit and was not in privity with the insured (74 A.2d 
at 306). Other cases are in accord. In Pharr v. Canal I ns'Ur-
ance Co., 233 S.C. 266 [104 S.E.2d 394], the court held that 
a declaratory jUdgment of nonliability, because of the in-
) 
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sured's breach of a cooperation clause, was not res judicata in I 
a later action between the injured person and the insurer. The 
court concluded that although the insurer had the right to 
raise the issue of breach of the duty of cooperation in the suit 
by the injured person and although the injured person would 
have been bound by the judgment had he been made a party 
to that action, nevertheless the earlier judgment, to which the 
injured person was not a party, did not bar the later action. 
New Amsterdam Oasualty 00. v. Murray, 242 F.2d 549, holds. 
that the injured person's rights against the tort feasor's insurE'" 
arise upon the happening of the accident and cannot there-
after be abridged by a judgment to which the injured person 
is not a party. A judgment cancelling the policy for having 
been procured by fraudulent representations was held not to 
be binding on the injured person. (See also Oentury Indem-
nity 00. v. Norbut, 117 N.J.Eq. 584 [177 .A. 248, 249-250] ; 
Ba~ley v. United States Fidelity & Guara·nty Co., 185 S.C. 169 
[193 S.E. 638, 641] ; Oollard v. U,livcl'sal Automobile Ins. 00., 
55 Idaho 560 [45 P.2d 288, 291] ; Pioneer Mut. Ca.~. 00. v. 
Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 68 Ohio App. 139 [37 
N.E.2d 412, 423-424] ; 18 A.L.R.2d 891.) 
[51 The judgment of reformation invoked by defendant 
in the present case was entered after plaintiffs had suffered 
the injuries for which they recovered jUdgment. As third-
party beneficiaries of the policy, plaintiffs then had an interest 
that could not be altered or conditioned by independent action 
of the insurer and the insured. (Olds v. General Acc. Fire 
etc. Corp., supra, 67 Cal.App.2d 812, 823.) Nor can these 
rights be conclusively determined against the injured persons 
in an action to which they were not made parties. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Spence, J., and Peters, J., con-
curred. ~ 
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would reverse the judgment, for 
the reasons expressed by Mr. Justil'(' Patrosso ill the opinion 
prepared by him for the District Court of Appeal in Rhapiro 
v. Republic Indemnity 00., (CaI.App.) 334 P.2d 594. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied .July 29, 
1959. Schauer, J., and McComb, J., were of the opinion 
that the petition should be granted. 
